The global financial crisis of 2008 that resulted in the collapse of many financial institutions in the United States (US) and Europe have resulted in debates over the failures of corporate governance structures to properly protect investors. The main objective of the study was to determine the relationship between corporate governance and performance of listed commercial banks in South Africa. The results of the study indicated a statistically positive significant relationship between board size, proportion of non-independent and non-executive directors and bank performance. The results of the rest of the corporate governance indicators are mixed when using different performance measurement variables.
Introduction
The last decade has seen considerable research on corporate governance and company performance. Companies have long recognised that good corporate governance generates positive returns and boosts the confidence of stakeholders. Poorly governed companies are expected to be less profitable, have the most bankruptcy risks, lower valuations and pay out less to their shareholders, while well-governed companies are expected to have higher profits, less bankruptcy risks, higher valuations and pay out more cash to their shareholders (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006).
It is generally accepted that boards of directors play a fundamental role in corporate governance and the structure of the board plays a significant role in the functioning of a company (Jensen, 1993) . Without proper governance control, managers are more likely to deviate from the interest of shareholders. The board, however, with its legal authority to hire, fire, and compensate top management teams, can set the premises of managerial decision-making, monitor managerial behaviour, and safeguard invested capital (Liang and Li, 1999; Fama and Jensen, 1983) .
Many empirical studies on corporate governance have indicated mixed results regarding corporate governance and various performance measures among listed firms (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006). Liang and Li (1999) concur with Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) and state that the available evidence of studies on the impact of board composition on company performance remain ambiguous, and the reason for the ambiguity is that most of the board composition studies were conducted using a sample of large public companies where the linkage between board composition and company performance is long and the observations are "noisy". To minimise the noise they propose that the board composition and company performance relationship is best observed in small privately owned companies.
Most studies on the relationship between corporate governance and performance were conducted internationally and focused on both nonfinancial institutions (see Liang and Li, 1999 Wameru, 2012) , and studies on corporate governance that focus on financial institution are scanty, the only study that the researcher could find is that of Young (2010) , which focuses on corporate governance and risk management. The main objective of this paper is therefore to narrow the gap and to contribute to the existing body of literature by investigating the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance of the top four listed commercial banks in South Africa. John and Qian (2003) argue that it is important to understand corporate governance and the degree of managerial alignment in banks because banks differ from manufacturing firms in that they are regulated to a higher degree than manufacturing firms. Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2013) concur with John and Qian (2003) by stating that unlike non-financial institutions, banks are subject to dual monitoring, by the regulatory bodies and also by the bank board. The monitoring and oversight of the regulators and the compliance of banks with regulatory requirements provide an alternative governance mechanism which is absent in a non-financial industry. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Firstly, a literature study presents the theoretical foundation of the study related to corporate governance and company performance. Secondly, the sample, variables and methodology employed are outlined. Thirdly, the analysis is carried out, and lastly the results of the analysis and the recommendations are outlined.
Literature review
The global financial crisis of 2008 that resulted in the collapse of many financial institutions in the United States (US) and Europe have resulted in debates over the failures of corporate governance structures to properly protect investors. It is said that eighty American banks failed between 2007 and 2009 due to the onslaught of the global financial crisis and a number of banks have become insolvent throughout the globe (Hoque, Islam, and Ahmed, 2013) . Much debate has since been raging on about whether the cause of the financial crises was the result of the failure of internal or external governance structures. The recent global financial crises is said to be the worst since the Great Depression in terms of both the economic costs and geographical spread (Claessens, Dell'Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2010).
Banking sector in South Africa
South Africa has developed a well-regulated banking system over the years that compares favourably with many developed countries. Legislation Although the banking system in South Africa was relatively insulated from the effects of the global financial crises of 2008 through appropriate monitoring and supervision (South African Reserve Bank, 2011), issues of corporate governance and financial performance remain of great concern to both the shareholders and regulatory authorities. Given that corporate governance is essentially a mechanism for addressing agency problems and controlling risk within the firm, it is not surprising that the recent initiatives and statements by banking supervisors, central banks, and other authorities have emphasised the importance of effective corporate governance practices in the banking sector.
Corporate governance in South Africa
The King Report on Corporate Governance is considered to be a ground-breaking code of corporate governance in South Africa One of the main duties of the board of directors, as stipulated in the King III report is to appoint the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and define its own level of materiality and approve a delegation of authority framework. The board should also ensure that the role and function of the CEO is formalised and the performance of the CEO is evaluated against the criteria specified by the board (King Report on Governance for South Africa, 2009). The recommendations further state that the board should comprise a majority of non-executive directors and a minimum of two executive directors of which one should be the CEO and the other the director responsible for finance.
Research objectives
The main objective of the study was to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and performance of the top four listed commercial banks in South Africa using data for the period 2009 to 2011. The reason for using the sample of the top four listed commercial banks in South Africa is because they together control over 90% of the retail market for personal transaction accounts (Competition Commission, 2008).
Research methodology

Data collection
The population of the study consisted of the top four commercial banks listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa. Secondary data used in the empirical study was obtained from two sources. First, the annual reports of the top four listed commercial banks were downloaded from their websites to obtain information relating to board structures and board composition. The second set of data was downloaded from the McGregor BFA website to obtain standardised financial statements of the top four commercial banks. The secondary data downloaded was for the year 2009 to 2011, thus allowing three years of uninterrupted observation. This period was deliberately chosen as it reflects the period immediately after the global crisis that started in the middle of 2007.
The study tested the relationship between corporate governance and a company's performance using premises and variables that have been used in prior studies. The study aimed to build on previous studies conducted on the relationship between corporate governance and company performance, with particular reference to Hoque, Islam and Ahmed 
Definition of variables and hypotheses
Prior studies on the relationship between corporate governance and company performance have used various internal and external variables, among which is board size, board composition, board committees, CEO's position-duality, CEO incentives and ownership interest, ownership concentration of insiders and outsiders, multiple directorships, debt financing, market for corporate control and so forth (Hoque, Islam and Ahmed, 2013).
Variables used to measure corporate governance
The following variables were used to measure the effectiveness of corporate governance:
Board size (BSIZE): Board size refers to the total number of directors on the board which includes both executive and non-executive directors. There are various views based on the size of the board and company performance. One view is that larger boards enhance company performance because they have a range of expertise to help make better decisions, and are harder for a powerful CEO to dominate (Muttakin and Ullah, 2012; Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006). The other view is that large boards are less effective and more susceptible to the influence of the CEO (Avouri, Hossain and Muttakin, 2011; Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1998; Jensen, 1993) . This view is supported by studies conducted by Gill and Mathur (2011) and Liang and Li (1999) which indicates that larger board size negatively impact on the profitability of companies. Jensen (1993) suggests that keeping boards small can help improve their performance. In this study the natural logarithm of total assets was used to determine board size (BSize). The first hypothesis of the study is thus stated as follows:
H1: There is no significant relationship between board size and bank performance.
Board diversity. Proportion of female board directors (PFBD):
Board diversity has to do with the gender composition of the board, that is, the percentage number of females versus the number of males in the board. It is argued that diversity of a corporate board enhances better monitoring and increase board independence. The study conducted by Erhardt, Werber and Shrader (2003) Proportion of executive/inside directors (PNED): Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) argue that the issue of whether directors should be employees of or affiliated with the company (executive/inside directors) or non-executive/outside directors has been thoroughly researched, yet no clear conclusion has been reached. According to Fama and Jensen (1983) , executive directors represent an important source of company-specific knowledge and their presence can lead to more effective decisionmaking. Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) state that executive directors also act as monitors to top management. This view is supported by Shakir (2008) and suggests that if executive directors play an effective monitoring role and provide first-hand information on the company's operations to other board members; this may increase the corporate governance structure of the company which will eventually lead to a better company performance. In contrast Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1998) argue that executive directors are more loyal to management, and thus the CEO can exert relatively more influence over them as opposed to nonexecutive directors. However, the study conducted by Nicholson and Kiel (2007) found a positive relationship between the proportion of executive directors and company performance. The third hypothesis is thus stated as follows:
H3: There is no significant relationship between the proportion of executive directors (PNED) and bank performance.
Proportion of non-independent and nonexecutive directors (PNINE):
While executive directors represent an important source of companyspecific knowledge and their presence can lead to more effective decision-making (Fama and Jensen, 1983) , the presence of non-executive directors may bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance and resources including key appointments and standards of conduct, and their independence from management can bring a degree of objectivity to the board's deliberations and play a valuable role in monitoring management decisions (Cadbury, 1992) . Non-executive directors may act as "professional referees" to ensure that competition among executive directors stimulates actions consistent with shareholder value maximisation (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006). In contrast, Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2013) argue that nonexecutive directors may become less effective as they gro older or serve on "too many" boards. Ho ever, the study conducted by Liang and Li (1999) indicates that the presence of non-executive directors is positively associated with higher return on investment. The fourth hypothesis is thus stated as follows:
H4: There is no significant relationship between the proportion of non-independent and non-executive directors and bank performance.
Board
independence. Proportion of independent directors (PINDD): Agency theory suggests that a higher proportion of independent directors should lead to a better firm performance since it reduces the conflict of interest between the shareholders and management and makes management more effective through better monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Muttakin and Ullah, 2012) . King 111 requires boards in South Africa to be comprised of a majority of non-executive directors, of whom the majority should be independent (KPMG, 2009 
Dependent variables
Variables used to measure bank performance. Traditional bank performance measures are similar to those applied in other industries, with return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) or cost-to-income ratio being the most widely used. In addition, given the importance of the intermediation function for banks, net interest margins are typically monitored (NIM) (European Central Bank, 2010). For the purpose of this study, only the accounting indicators return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) were used as proxies to measure bank performance. The return on assets (ROA) was calculated by dividing earnings before interest and tax by total assets. Total assets in this case include only tangible assets.
Return on assets = Net income/Total assets ROE was calculated by dividing earnings before interest and tax by total equity. Return on equity = Net income/Total equity
Control variables
Since the performance of the bank may be influenced by several factors, the following control variables were considered in the study: Bank/company size (LNTA): According to Crumley (2008) , one of the most important influences of compensation in literature is the size of the company. The size of the company is measured by book value of assets, level of sales and number of employees being managed. The size of the banks in this study was measured as the value of its assets base, total assets excluding intangible assets were used as measure of the size of the bank. For the regression analysis, we use the log of the assets because the values are widely spread. The sixth hypothesis is thus:
H6: There is no significant relationship between bank size and bank performance.
Debt-to-equity ratio (D/E): D/E = ratio of debt to equity
Banks have a unique capital structure as distinguished by its equity and liabilities. Macey and O'Hara (2003) states that banks receive 90 per cent or more of their funding from debt, which are largely in the form of deposits available to their creditors/depositors on demand, while their assets often take the form of loans that have longer maturities. Thus the bank is creating the liquidity for the economy through the holding of illiquid assets (loans) and issuing liquid liabilities (deposits) (Zulkafli and Samad, 2007) . This mismatch between deposits and liabilities becomes a problem in the unusual situation of a bank run (Macey and O'Hara, 2003) . Debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) was therefore used as the second control variable in this study. Debt-toequity ratio (D/E) was calculated by dividing the banks total liabilities (debt) by total equity. Debt-to equity (D/E) = Total liabilities (debt)/total equity.
The seventh and last hypothesis is therefore stated as follows:
H7: There is no significant relationship between debt-to-equity ratio and bank performance. 
Results
Descriptive statistics
Explanation of variables: BSIZE -the number of members on the board; ROE -return on equity; ROA -return on assets; D/E -debt equity ratio; PNINE -percentage number of independent and non-executive directors; PINDD -percentage number of independent directors; PFBD -percentage number of female board directors; PNED -percentage number of executive directors, LNTA-size of the bank.
According to Table 1 , the average valid observations is n = 12. The banks included in the sample have an average of R15 569 583 333 fixed assets (FA), R872 000 000 000 total assets (TA), R807 000 000 000 total liabilities (TL) R9 824 166 667 net income (NI), and R70 468 000 000 total equity (TE). The average return on equity (ROE) is 14.03%, average return on assets (ROA) is 1.16%, and the banks have an average debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) of 99.71424%. The banks also have an average board size (BSIZE) of 20 members, and an average percentage of independent directors (PINDD) of 57.32%. Table 2 depicts the first regression model. The results of the third regression analysis are also presented in two phases. In the first phase ROE is used as a dependent variable. The results of the third regression indicate no statistically significant relationship between PNED (0.867), LNTA (0.737) and ROE, but indicate a statistically negative significant relationship between D/E (0.004) and ROE. The F test for ROE equals 5.858 and is statistically positive significant at 0.020. In the second phase ROA is used as dependent variable. The results indicate no statistically significant relationship between PNED (0.826), LNTA (0.754) and ROA, but indicate statistically negative significant relationship between D/E (0.001) and ROA. The F test for ROA equals 11.002 and is statistically positive significant at 0.003. The results are in contrast with the study conducted by Nicholson and Kiel (2007) which found a positive relationship between the proportion of executive directors and company performance. The fourth regression has the same predictors as the third regression, except that PNED is replaced by a proportion of non-independent and non-executive directors (PNINE), ROE and ROA still remain the independent variables. Table 5 report the results of the sixth regression analysis. In the fourth regression return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are used as dependent variables, while percentage number of nonindependent and non-executive directors (PNINE), debt-to-equity ratio (D/E), and size of the bank as measured by the logarithm of total assets (LNTA) are used as predictors. The results of the analysis are reported in two phases. In the first phase ROE is used as dependent variable. The results indicate a statistically positive significant relationship between PNINE (0.021), LNTA (0.046) and ROE, and a statistically negative significant relationship between D/E (0.000) and ROE. The F test for ROE equals 14.626 and is statistically positive significant at 0.001. In the second phase ROA is used as dependent variable. The result indicates a statistically positive significant relationship between PNINE (0.007), LNTA (0.026) and ROA, and a statistically negative significant relationship between D/E (0.000) and ROA. The F test for ROA equals 32.974 and is statistically positive significant at 0.000. The results are consistent with the study conducted by Liang and Li (1999) which indicated that the presence of nonexecutive directors is positively associated with higher return on investment. The fifth regression has the same predictors as the fourth regression, except that PNINE is replaced by percentage number of independent directors (PINDD). ROE and ROA still remains the independent variables. Table 6 report the results of the second regression analysis. The results of the fifth regression are also reported in two phases. In the first phase ROE is used as a dependent variable. The results of the regression indicate no statistical relationship between PINDD (0.060), LNTA (0.070) and ROE, but reveal a statistically negative significant relationship between D/E (0.001) and ROE. The F test for ROE equals 10.895 and is statistically positive significant at 0.003. In the second phase ROA is used as a dependent variable. The result indicates a statistically negative significant relationship between PINDD (0.031), D/E (0.000), and ROA, and a statistically positive significant relationship between LNTA (0.047) and ROA. The F test for ROA equals 22.527 and is statistically positive significant at 0.000. The results are inconclusive as they indicate a weaker positive relationship between PINDD and ROE, and a statistically positive significant relationship using the bank performance measure ROA, which is consistent with the results obtained by Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2013), Muttakin and Ullah (2012), El-Mastry (2010), and Liang and Li (1999) . Table 7 provides a summary of the list of variables, the stated hypotheses and the results thereof.
Limitations of the study
The first limitation is that the data of this study was limited to a period of three years, 2009 to 2011. The second limitation is that the sample was drawn from the top four listed commercial banks in South Africa; other small commercial banks were not included in the sample.
Conclusion
One of the major roles of the board of directors is to ensure that the interests of shareholders and managers are closely aligned in order to ensure optimal performance of the company. The main objective of this paper was to determine the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance of the four top listed commercial banks in South Africa using data for the period 2009 to 2011. Accountingbased measures, namely ROA and ROE were used to measure the financial performance against various corporate governance variables including board sixe (BSIZE), the proportion of female board directors (PFBD), proportion of non-executive directors (PNED), proportion of non-independent and nonexecutive directors (PNINE) and percentage number of independent directors (PINDD). Control variables such as debt equity ratio (D/E) and bank size as measured by logarithm of total assets (LNTA) were used during the study.
The results on the relationship between board size (BSIZE) and bank performance indicated a significantly positive relationship using both two measures of bank performance ROE and ROA. The results support the view that larger boards are better for company performance because they have a range of expertise to help make decisions and are harder for a powerful CEO to dominate (Muttakin and Board composition has to do with the number of executive directors (inside directors) versus the number of non-executive directors (outside directors). With regards to the proportionate number of executive directors (PNED), the results indicated no statistically significant relationship with bank performance for both ROE and ROA. The results are in contrast with the study conducted by Kiel and Nicholson (2003) which found a positive relationship between the proportion of executive directors and company performance. Executive directors (inside directors) form part of management and have specific skills, their presence in the board should lead to more effective decision-making (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006), and their ability to provide first hand inside information on the company's operations to other board members may increase the corporate governance structure of the company and lead to better company performance (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1998) . The reason why the relationship between executive directors and bank performance is insignificant in the banks in South Africa might be the fact that the majority of the sampled banks had only two executive directors, the CEO and the chief financial officer (CFO) as recommended by the King III report.
On the other hand the results of the proportion of non-independent and non-executive directors (PNINE) indicated a statistically positive and significant relationship using both bank performance measures ROE and ROA which is consistent with the study conducted by Liang and Li (1999) . Because non-executive directors are not part of management, their independence may bring a degree of objectivity to the board and they may act as "professional referees" to ensure that the interests of shareholders are protected (Cadbury, 1992 ; Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006). The presence of non-executive directors should therefore represent a means of monitoring the actions of the executive directors and of ensuring that the executive directors are pursuing policies consistent with shareholders interest.
Board independence is represented in this study by the proportion of independent directors (PINDD). The results of the study indicated a statistically negative weaker relationship when using the performance measurement ROE and a statistically negative significant relationship when using ROA as a performance measure, which is consistent with the results obtained by Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2013), Muttakin and Ullah (2012), El-Mastry (2010), and Liang and Li (1999) . The results of the relationship between bank size (BSIZE) and bank performance are inconclusive for both ROE and ROA, while the relationship between debt-equity-ratio (D/E) and bank performance indicates a statistically negative and significant relationship with bank performance, an indication that bank insolvency may affect the performance of the bank.
Managerial implication and recommendations
Based on the results obtained, it is evident that corporate governance is reasonable implemented by commercial banks in South Africa, this might be the results of the regulatory environment and the recommendations of King 1, King 11 and King 111 reports. The legislative framework that govern banks in South Africa has also played a major role in strengthening the governing structures of the banks hence the global financial crisis had little impact on the South African banking system. However, banks in South Africa should not become complacent, but must seek to improve their corporate governance structures to ensure that the agency and stewardship forces in the banks are well managed.
It is further recommended that banks in South Africa should maintain a reasonable board size which consists of a mixture of skills or expects since larger boards are better for company performance, but the size of the board must not be too large to manage to ensure timely resolution in decision making. With regard to board diversity, the proportion of female directors in the board (PFBD) should not be used as a token but should be used to enhance the governance of the banks. The proportion of independent directors should be increased as recommended by the King reports, but banks should ensure that independent directors are skilled and effective, and that they are evaluated annually to ensure that they remain committed and do not serve in too many companies as that might hamper their effectiveness.
